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Abstract: A large volume of past research has suggested that making information on people’s 
past behaviors visible to others may enhance cooperation in finitely repeated environments. But, 
do people cooperate with randomly-matched peers by voluntarily revealing their past when they 
have an option to conceal it? This paper experimentally shows that while voluntary information 
disclosure does help strengthen cooperation in a random-matching environment, such disclosure 
does not have effects if it involves a cost because a large fraction of people does not reveal their 
past. The data also shows that, when subjects can choose an environment with a reputation 
mechanism or one without it, a stable number of subjects join the reputation community (where 
their past is revealed) and cooperate with others, especially when the sorting involves a cost. 
However, some subjects stay away from the reputation community and fail to cooperate with 
peers in the ‘anonymous’ community (where their past is not revealed). When there is no cost for 
sorting process, the reputation mechanism’s high efficiency may decrease because some subjects 
frequently switch between the two communities and attempt to exploit cooperators, although 
they could cooperate with others if they were forced to disclose without opportunities to choose. 
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1. Introduction 
How people can successfully cooperate in dilemma situations is one of the oldest and the 
most important questions in economics. One of the actively studied dilemmas in the last few 
decades by scholars, including social scientists and biologists, is two-person dilemmas. In a two-
person dilemma game, the total payoff amount of two players is maximized when they both 
choose cooperation. However, under the assumption that players are self-interested and that they 
believe all of their peers are also self-interested, the Pareto-efficient outcome cannot be achieved 
if it is only finitely repeated. This is because defecting on one’s partner results in a higher payoff 
for the defector, no matter what actions the partner takes.  
Scholars have long been interested in how to sustain cooperation in such finitely repeated 
two-person dilemmas with random matching. As discussed in the seminal work by Kreps et al. 
(1982), mutual cooperation is theoretically possible if people believe that their peers are not 
selfish or they believe that some of their peers believe that not everyone is selfish. Nevertheless, 
it is empirically known that although some people attempt to cooperate in earlier periods of 
finitely repeated dilemma games, people’s level of cooperation steadily declines over time if no 
additional institutions are available (e.g., Dal Bó and Dal Bó, 2014; Kamei, 2016a).
1
 However, a 
large volume of studies have proposed that reputation, or information on people’s past behaviors, 
may help people resolve dilemmas and achieve mutual cooperation in various setups (e.g., 
Engelmann and Fischbacher, 2009; Bolton et al., 2004, 2005; Kamei and Putterman, 2017; 
Nowak et al., 2000; Milinski et al., 2002).
2
 Research so far has indicated that three particular 
factors come into play in a reputation mechanism. First, the presence of a reputation mechanism 
may give people material incentives to build a cooperative reputation and to cooperate (e.g., 
Andreoni and Miller, 1993; Kamei and Putterman, 2017; Bolton et al., 2004, 2005; Engelmann 
and Fischbacher, 2009). Maintaining a mutually cooperative relationship is more materially 
beneficial than exploiting counterparts and then being trapped in a mutual defection if they meet 
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 Also see Ledyard (1995) and Chaudhuri (2011). 
2
 The impact of exogenously given information on boosting cooperation has also been demonstrated in infinitely 
repeated dilemma game experiments with random matching (e.g., Camera and Casari, 2009; Kamei, 2017). 
3 
more than once. Thus, a selfish individual may mimic the behavior of cooperative individuals 
and strategically build a reputation as a highly cooperative person in order to establish mutually 
cooperative relationships with others. Second, some individuals may receive psychological 
satisfaction from mutual cooperation, explained by concepts such as altruism, inequity aversion 
and direct reciprocity, while they are averse to being exploited by others (see Fehr and Schmidt 
(2006) and Sobel (2005) for a survey). As information on the past may serve as a signal that they 
will cooperate or defect with their peers in the future, reputation mechanisms can act as 
coordination devices for people to fulfill their desires to cooperate.  Lastly, some individuals may 
exhibit indirect reciprocity even towards strangers, as shown by Engelmann and Fischbacher 
(2009), Seinen and Schram (2006), Nowak and Sigmund (1998a, b), Wedekind and Milinski 
(2000), and Wedekind and Braithwaite (2002). Because pro-social behavior can be rewarded by 
strangers, individuals – even selfish ones, may have a sufficient incentive to cooperate when 
their behavior can be seen by others in the future. Nevertheless, do people in fact choose to 
disclose their past in a random-matching community and voluntarily cooperate with each other if 
there is an alternative choice to hide it? Moreover, if subjects’ disclosure decisions determine 
with whom they interact with, i.e., if there is sorting through disclosure in that disclosers are 
matched with disclosers and non-disclosers are matched with non-disclosers, how do subjects’ 
disclosure decisions change in two-person dilemmas with random matching? Although there is a 
rich body of studies on the role of reputation institutions (‘exogenously’ given to subjects) in the 
evolution of cooperation, little attention has been paid to the possibility where people create 
reputation communities through voluntary disclosure of information in finitely repeated dilemma 
situations, or to people’s preferences between an environment with and without a reputation 
mechanism in dilemma situations.  
There are many real-world situations in which individuals make information disclosure 
decisions in random-matching environments. For instance, in some countries, such as China, 
people’s option to voluntarily disclose their reputational information built on online platforms, 
so-called ‘social credit’, has emerged and users are encouraged to reveal such scores to potential 
4 
interaction persons (e.g., Hatton 2015).
3
 Another example is companies’ disclosure of accounting 
and/or corporate information in annual reports: some companies voluntarily disclose more 
detailed information than required by the government. When a firm is looking for a business 
partner, they may encounter some firms that voluntarily disclose more precise corporate or 
reputational information than others. Situations where individuals make sorting decisions have 
also substantially increased in our modern societies. Examples include online-based interactions, 
such as emerging businesses based on the sharing economy and dating services. For instance, 
users can choose whether to use (i) Uber services, where a two-way rating and feedback system 
is present, or (ii) private cruising taxis available on street, for which no information about the 
reputation of their services is available, when getting a ride to an airport. Using the Uber services 
may be costly because users need to install the application and also register or update their 
profiles. Although there is no such cost involved, interactions like option (ii) create more 
anonymous interactions across users. What fractions of people prefer option (i), instead of option 
(ii)? Does users’ selection of an environment affect their opportunistic behaviors (e.g., a driver 
treats her passenger poorly or a passenger behaves arrogantly)?
4
 Similarly, when deciding on a 
residential location, one may consider choosing to relocate to an area with well-functioning 
public monitoring. But in order for a person to become a member of a community with such 
reputation mechanisms, the new person must become known by other members of the 
community. For this purpose the person will need to incur some cost (e.g., time) to connect with 
others and introduce himself (background, personality, etc.) to the community.
5
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 On social networks, while some users use their real name and disclose their background, other users only use 
anonymous usernames. Their disclosure of background information may also be related to their willingness to show 
their reputation and to interact with like-minded others. 
4
 For another example, singles may seek to join an online dating service where the users can see other users’ detailed 
background information (e.g., incomes). These services, however, often require users to pay membership fees or 
require them to spend some time registering, ask them to submit supporting documents to verify the information in 
some platforms, and/or updating their profiles that will be made available to other users. Thus, joining in a network 
with people’s personal information is often not cost-free. By contrast, there are usually alternative networks that do 
not require users to pay or spend time in submitting their detailed information. 
5
 Unlike transactions in online platforms or a person’s relocation to a new place just discussed, in small-scale 
economies, such as a close-knit residential community without sorting, news related to residents spread across the 
community without anyone making an effort. Such situations can be modeled by assuming that information 
automatically spreads among those involved without a cost; and a person needs to spend a cost if s/he oppositely 
does not want to disclose some information. This situation was recently studied by Kamei (2017). 
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According to the experimental literature on repeated dilemmas, cooperation may evolve 
through voluntary information disclosure or through sorting in a finitely repeated environment 
with random matching. First, past studies on repeated supergames suggest that people indeed 
prefer to cooperate with each other; and they can achieve a high level of cooperation in earlier 
rounds of interactions if they repeat supergames under some conditions (e.g., Selten and Stoecker 
[1986], Andreoni and Miller [1993], Embrey et al. [forthcoming], Kamei and Putterman 
[2017]).
6
 Our study does not let subjects repeat finitely repeated dilemma games since we are 
interested in the impact of information disclosure or sorting without learning effects across 
supergames (see Section 2). Moreover, the quantity of information depends on subjects’ 
decisions to disclose. Nevertheless, information disclosure or sorting process may serve as 
coordination devices, and thus people may be able to achieve a high level of cooperation as an 
outcome of rational behavior (e.g., Tyran and Feld, 2006; Duffy and Feltovich 2002, 2006).  
We conducted a finitely repeated two-person public goods game experiment where 
subjects have an option to disclose their last-period contribution amounts to their matched 
partners in every period. There are two dimensions in the experimental design. The first 
dimension is the matching protocol: whether subjects are randomly matched with each other in 
every period irrespective of their disclosure decision, or subjects are in principle assured that a 
discloser will be matched with another randomly-selected discloser and likewise a non-discloser 
will be matched with another non-discloser in each period. The latter means that a subject can 
sort into a community with a reputation mechanism. The second dimension is the disclosure cost: 
whether disclosure/sorting is costly or cost-free. Thus, our experimental design is a 2  2 design. 
With this setup, theoretical analyses suggest a possibility of rational cooperation. For 
instance, we illustrate in Section 3 that it would be materially beneficial for even a selfish player 
to strategically mimic the behavior of conditional cooperators if there are sufficiently large 
number of conditional cooperative disclosers in a given community.  
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 The past studies nevertheless found that earlier unraveling of cooperation is also observed with experiences in later 
supergames 
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Our experiment showed that information endogenously disclosed indeed helps increase 
the level of cooperation, compared with when no information is provided. However, the 
effectiveness depends on the presence of disclosure cost, as subjects are reluctant to disclose 
their past if it involves a cost and accordingly the quantity of information stays at a low level. 
Nevertheless, whether disclosure was made costly or for free, the average contributions declined 
gradually and steadily from period to period.  
However, our data showed that if subjects are given an opportunity to join the reputation 
mechanism by paying a cost, they are able to achieve a higher level of cooperation in a 
community with the reputation mechanism, compared with the random-matching environment. 
The same does not hold for the treatment where the sorting is free. Nevertheless, the efficiency 
of the costly-sorting treatment is not significantly different from that of voluntary information 
disclosure without disclosure cost and sorting, because an inefficient anonymous community also 
emerges in the former treatment. Detailed analyses revealed that subjects are able to cooperate 
with each other at high levels if all subjects are forced to reveal their past; however, given an 
option to choose between disclosing and not disclosing, some subjects decide not to disclose and 
then to behave opportunistically. This paper discusses driving forces behind these results. 
The main contributions of our paper to the literature are two-fold. First, this paper 
contributes to a growing body of experimental literature on the evolution of cooperation in 
finitely repeated dilemma games, by providing evidence that rational cooperation may emerge 
through people’s voluntary disclosure of their past behavior alone. Second, we show that the 
level of cooperation is still modest with voluntary information disclosure only due to the 
prevalence of the non-negligible fraction of non-disclosers, but when people have a costly self-
selection opportunity between communities with and without the reputation mechanism, 
cooperation can be sustained at a high level in the community with reputation, although a sizable 
anonymous community with low efficiency also emerges.  
7 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 summarizes the experimental design, 
Section 3 discusses possible subject’s behaviors and hypotheses of our study, Section 4 reports 
results and Section 5 concludes. 
2. Experimental Design 
Our study is based on an incentivized laboratory experiment. The design frame used is a 
two-person public good game (e.g., Ledyard, 1995; Chaudhuri, 2011). The experiments consist 
of 20 periods of interactions. In each period, each subject is paired with another subject, is given 
an endowment of 20 ECUs (experimental currency units) and simultaneously decides how many 
ECUs they wish to contribute for their pair’s joint account. 
Each period, except period 1, consists of two stages (Figure 1). In the first stage of a 
given period t ∈ {2, 3, …, 20}, subjects decides whether to disclose their period t – 1 allocation 
decisions to their current partners matched for period t. We vary the treatments by two 
dimensions (Table 1). The first dimension is the size of disclosure cost: either the disclosure is 
free or one ECU is charged. In costly-disclosing treatments, one ECU is deducted at the end of a 
given period (a subject has 20 ECUs in her allocation-decision stage even when she decides to 
costly disclose her last-period allocation amount). The second dimension is the matching 
protocol: one that a discloser is assured that he or she is matched with another discloser, or the 
other that each subject is randomly matched with another subject, regardless of disclosure 
decision (Section 2.1). Our design is therefore a 2  2 factorial design. The four treatments are 
named as the “Costly Sorting” treatment, abbreviated as the C-Soring treatment, “Free Sorting” 
treatment, abbreviated as the F-Soring treatment, the “Costly Disclosure, Random Matching” 
treatment, abbreviated as the C-RM treatment, and the “Free Disclosure, Random Matching” 
treatment, abbreviated as the F-RM treatment. (We also conducted three additional treatments, as 
will be discussed in Section 4, for better controls to study the impact of sorting and disclosure.) 
2.1. Matching Protocol  
8 
In period 1, each subject is randomly matched with another subject without making any 
disclosure or sorting decisions; and then plays the public goods game with the matched subject. 
As mentioned, each period after period 1 consists of two stages (Figure 1). In the two 
sorting treatments (F-Sorting, C-Sorting), subjects in period t ∈{2, 3, …, 20} decides whether to 
disclose their period t – 1 allocation amounts to join the ‘reputation’ community in period t. If a 
subject chooses to disclose her previous behavior, she is randomly matched with another subject 
that likewise chose to disclose his last-period contribution amount. The disclosing cost is one 
ECU in the C-Sorting and is free in the F-Sorting treatment. Alternatively, a subject could join a 
community of non-disclosers in period t, which we call the ‘anonymous’ community, by 
choosing not to disclose her allocation amount in the previous period. In that case, her previous 
contribution amount would not be informed to her current matched partner (and one ECU is not 
deducted at the end of period t in the C-Sorting treatment). She is then randomly matched with 
another non-discloser; and the partner is only informed that he is randomly matched with another 
person in the community of non-disclosers.
7
  
In the two random-matching treatments (C-RM and F-RM), each subject in period t ∈{2, 
3, …, 20} decides whether to disclose his or her period t – 1 allocation amount in the period t 
interaction as in the C-Sorting and F-Sorting treatments, respectively. However, in these two 
treatments, each subject is randomly matched with another subject, regardless of their disclosure 
decision. The consequences of subjects’ disclosure decisions, except the matching procedures, 
are the same as those in the sorting treatments. That is, when a subject decides to disclose in 
period t, the subject’s matched partner in that period is informed of her period t – 1 allocation 
decision; and the partner is not given this information when the subject decides not to disclose. 
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 If the number of disclosers (non-disclosers) is an odd number, one discloser is randomly matched with a non-
discloser. This event happened only around 9.3% of the paring in the C-Sorting treatment and 6.9% of it in the F-
Sorting treatment. Further data analyses (Section 4) indicate that the paper’s findings are robust, regardless of 
whether we use data of pairs consisting of pairs with the same preferences (two-disclosers pairs and two-non-
disclosers pairs) only or all data. 
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There are no subject identification numbers provided during the entire experiment. Thus, 
the only way that subjects could form reputation is through their disclosure (sorting) decisions in 
the C-RM and F-RM (C-Sorting and F-Sorting) treatments. 
2.2. Allocation Decisions 
Each matched pair in every period plays a two-person linear public goods game. Only 
integers between 0 and 20 are allowed for their contribution amounts. The payoff consequences 
are as follows: a subject receives one ECU for each ECU she allocates to her private account. By 
contrast, if she contributes one ECU to the joint account, she and her partner each receive 0.8 
ECUs, which is less than one ECU, from the joint account. However, the total group payoff is 
maximized when two subjects in a pair both contribute all of their endowments to the joint 
account (0.82 = 1.6 > 1.0). Suppose that subject i contributes ci,t to her joint account in period t. 
Then, subject i obtains the following payoff in period t: 
 𝜋𝑖,𝑡 = 20 − 𝑐𝑖,𝑡 + .8 ∙ (𝑐𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑐𝑗,𝑡). (1) 
Here, subject j is subject i’s matched person in period t and cj,t is subject j’s contribution to the 
joint account in period t. 
2.3. Conditional Contribution Schedule and Beliefs 
We include two kinds of additional tasks in order to explore driving forces behind 
subjects’ reputation building behaviors in the C-RM and F-RM treatments and subjects’ 
community formation in the C-Sorting and F-Sorting treatments as supplementary analyses. The 
first additional task is elicitation of beliefs. First, in each allocation-decision stage (period 1 and 
second stage of period t ∈ {2, 3, …, 20}) of all treatments, subjects are asked about their beliefs 
on their matched partner’s contribution amount in a given period. We note that in the elicitation 
stage, subjects are aware of their partners’ current-period disclosure decisions and the partners’ 
last-period contribution behaviors in case they select to disclose. Second, subjects in the C-RM 
and F-RM treatments are also asked to answer the expected number of disclosers (except 
themselves) in period t. These elicitation tasks were not incentivized because our first priority is 
10 
on subjects’ actual behaviors and also because incentivized elicitation may affect subjects’ actual 
contribution behaviors (see Gächter and Renner 2010, for example).
8,9
   
Second, we elicit subjects’ cooperation types using Fischbacher et al. (2001). Specifically, 
each subject is asked to answer how many ECUs they wish to allocate to their group, conditional 
on each of the other group members’ average contributions. This task is incentivized. The details 
of the procedure for this part are provided in the online Appendix A. This task is conducted 
before the 20 periods of the finitely repeated public goods game. However, subjects are informed 
of the outcomes of this task only after they complete the 20 periods of the public goods games to 
minimize the effects of this task on their behaviors. In addition, group composition is randomly 
changed between this elicitation task and the 20 periods of repeated dilemmas. The elicited 
conditional contribution preferences are used to examine whether cooperation-oriented types are 
more likely to disclose their past behavior and how selfish types strategically build reputations. 
2.4. Experimental Procedure 
All experiments except the instructions were programmed using z-tree (Fischbacher, 
2007). Eligible subjects were sent solicitation messages via ORSEE (Online Recruitment System 
for Economic Experiments) developed by Greiner (2015); and subjects voluntarily registered for 
and participated in the experiment. At the onset of the experiment, neutrally framed instructions 
for the conditional contribution task were handed out to subjects and read aloud by the 
experimenter. Once the task for eliciting cooperation types was over, instructions for the main 
part of the experiment (20 periods of public goods games), which are likewise neutrally framed, 
were distributed and read aloud. Control questions were included in each set of the instructions 
so as to check the subjects’ understanding of the experiment. Communication was prohibited 
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 In the experiment, this task was only included in the instructions shown on subjects’ computer screens, not in the 
hard copy of instructions distributed to subjects, in order to avoid making this task salient. 
9
 Gächter and Renner (2010) experimentally show that subjects’ contribution behavior is not affected if belief 
elicitation is not incentivized, but it is affected if belief elicitation is incentivized. They also show that the difference 
in belief accuracy is relatively small between when it is incentivized and when it is not. A possible way to 
incentivize beliefs is, for example, to randomly select some periods for payments based on belief accuracy and the 
other for payments based on the actual contribution behaviors. We did not employ this method because our first 
priority is on actual contribution behavior and also because it could make the experiment too complex. 
11 
during the entire experiment. Subjects were also asked to switch off any electronic devices (e.g., 
mobile phones) during the experiment. Subjects were privately paid based on their accumulated 
ECUs (40 ECUs are exchanged for £1 of real money) at the end of the experiment. 
A total of 16 sessions – four sessions for each treatment – were conducted. As explained 
in Section 4, another ten sessions were also conducted as additional treatments with the same 
subject pool and recruiting procedure mentioned above to identify the effects of information 
disclosure and sorting more in details. A total of 292 Durham University students participated in 
the experiment from August 2015 through August in 2017.
10
 No subjects participated in more 
than one session. The average payment (including show-up fee of £3) was £15.61 with a 
standard deviation of £1.06. The average duration of the experiment (including payment to the 
subjects) was around 90 minutes. 
3. Theoretical Considerations and Discussions 
 Standard theory, based on agents’ selfishness and the common knowledge of rationality, 
provides a point prediction in our environment because the MPCR is 0.8 (see Eq. (1)). That is, 
contributing zero ECUs to the joint account is a strictly dominant strategy for each subject in any 
period (∂i,t/∂ci,t = –.2 < 0). Therefore, with the logic of backward induction, each subject would 
contribute nothing to the joint account in every period, assuming that they believe other subjects 
would always choose defection without considering their opponents’ reputations. Considering 
the peers’ uniform full free-riding behavior, no one would costly disclose their past towards the 
matched person in any period in the C-RM treatment; and likewise no one would costly sort into 
the reputation community in the C-Sorting treatment, because they would want to save a 
disclosure/sorting cost. Disclosure or sorting decisions do not affect subjects’ payoffs in the F-
RM and F-Sorting treatments, respectively, because these actions can be taken for free and their 
peers would select defection always; hence, subjects would randomly decide whether to disclose 
and sort in the two treatments. 
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 The session size was 12 subjects in all sessions, except one session each in the C-Sorting, F-RM, F-Sorting, 
Baseline and C-Sorting-N treatments. The session size was eight for these five sessions.  
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HYPOTHESIS 1: Standard Theory Prediction.  
(a) No one costly discloses their last-period contribution behavior in the C-RM treatment. No 
one costly sorts into the reputation community in the C-Sorting treatment. (b) Disclosure and 
sorting decisions are randomly made by subjects in the F-RM and F-Sorting treatments, 
respectively. (c) Subjects contribute nothing to the joint accounts in each period in all treatments. 
A large body of experimental research has partially confirmed Hypothesis 1(c) in finitely 
repeated dilemma games when there are no institutions such as disclosing information and 
sorting involved. It demonstrates that although subjects contribute around 40% to 60% of the 
endowment in the public goods games and around 30% to 40% of subjects choose to cooperate 
in the prisoner’s dilemma games in earlier periods, they decrease the levels of cooperation 
steadily from period to period (see, e.g., Ledyard [1995] and Chaudhuri [2011] for surveys on 
public goods games; Andreoni and Miller [1993], Dal Bó and Dal Bó [2014], Dal Bó et al. 
[2010], and Kamei [2016a] for evidence on prisoner’s dilemma games).11 
 But on the other hand, theoretically, ‘rational’ cooperation can be possible even in a 
finitely repeated dilemma game if we assume that some people believe that some fraction of their 
peers act on discriminating strategies, such as the tit-for-tat (e.g., Kreps et al., 1982).
12
  In fact, in 
some setups where subjects repeat a finitely repeated dilemma game (supergame), including the 
ones with partner matching, past research has found that subjects may be able to achieve high 
levels of cooperation in earlier periods of later supergames (e.g., Selten and Stoecker, 1986; 
Andreoni and Miller, 1993; Embrey et al., forthcoming; Kamei and Putterman, 2017).
13
 
                                                          
11
 People’s difficulty in achieving mutual cooperation with no institutions, due to strategic uncertainty, has also 
documented for some coordination games with Pareto-ranked equilibria. For instance, subjects’ interactions quickly 
converge to the worst equilibrium outcome in the minimum games (see Devetag and Ortmann [2007] for a survey). 
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 We note that strategies like the ‘tit-for-tat’ can be evolutionarily stable and can lead to mutual cooperation also in 
infinitely repeated interactions (e.g., Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Axelrod, 1984; Wedekind and Milinski, 1996). 
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 Our study used a random matching protocol. We note that when a random matching protocol is used, without any 
reputation mechanisms, the average cooperation rate is known to stay at very low rates even if supergames are 
repeated (e.g., Andreoni and Miller, 1993; Kamei and Putterman, 2017). 
13 
Andreoni and Miller (1993) and Kamei and Putterman (2017) also provide evidence that some 
subjects are non-selfish types and their presence may contribute to the above phenomenon.
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 Our studies explore the impact of information disclosure and sorting with a standard 
single-supergame design under a random-matching protocol. With the disclosure (sorting) 
institutions alone in the C-RM and F-RM (C-Sorting and F-Sorting) treatments, it might be 
difficult for subjects to foster cooperation norms in communities. This is because subjects in our 
study can disclose their last-period contribution amounts only, without showing the past history 
which contains their last-period partner’s profiles (e.g., disclosers or non-disclosers, or the levels 
of cooperation in case that the last-period partners were disclosers). The lack of such second-
order information could make it difficult for a community to achieve high cooperation norms, 
because a subject can be reluctant to contribute a large amount when she is matched with a 
discloser who has a low level of contributions in his record, even if the partner was matched with, 
for example, a non-discloser in the previous period. Further, subjects have the reputation 
mechanism only and do not have any additional stages such as an informal punishment stage. 
Thus, a subject needs to select a low level of cooperation if she is matched with a low contributor 
and wants to punish him. However, such a punitive action would lower the subject’s own 
reputation score. Thus, who imposes such punishment could be an issue. 
Even with our framework, nevertheless, subjects’ rational cooperation behavior as 
discussed in Kreps et al. (1982) may happen, for example, if there is a non-negligible fraction of 
subjects who act on the so-called ‘conditional cooperation strategy’ (e.g., Fischbacher et al., 
2001; Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010), or if subjects act on a contagious punishment strategy 
(grim trigger strategy) as discussed in Kandori (1992) in an infinitely repeated setup. The 
conditional cooperation strategy is similar to the tit-for-tat strategy.
15
 Specifically, the 
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 See Reuben and Suetens (2012) also. They used an indefinitely repeated sequential prisoner’s dilemma game with 
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 Some subjects’ conditional cooperation behaviors can be rationalized by assuming that they have interdependent 
preferences, such as inequity aversion (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) and reciprocity (e.g., Rabin, 1993; 
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Cox et al., 2007). 
14 
conditional cooperation strategy is where subject m contributes x∙Sj,t, where x(0,1], in period t if 
her pair partner j’s state (last-period contribution) is Sj,t = cj,t-1 and the state is observable; and m 
contributes zero ECUs, otherwise. A large volume of experimental research has found the 
prevalence of such conditional cooperators (those who act on the conditional cooperation 
strategy). The steady decline of contributions in a repeated dilemma game with no institutions 
mentioned earlier can be interpreted that conditional cooperators are discouraged from 
cooperating by seeing selfish types free ride (e.g., Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010). The 
contagious punishment strategy in the latter example is a grim-trigger strategy in which a 
member who sees one instance of free riding starts to free ride from any future partners believing 
others would do the same, as Kandori (1992) describes that “trust is attached to the community 
as a whole.” We discuss a possibility of rational cooperation with these two strategies now. 
The Presence of Conditional Cooperators and Subjects’ Strategic Reputation Building: 
Let us study a possibility of rational cooperation by examining the reputation building 
behavior of material payoff maximizer i, assuming that there exist three types in the population: 
(a) subjects who choose to hide and act on the “always to defect” strategy (a strategy where 
players unconditionally select defection), (b) subjects who choose to disclose and act on a 
conditional cooperation strategy, and (c) subjects who choose to disclose but behave 
opportunistically (contribute zero to the joint account). 
We first consider the C-RM and F-RM treatments.  Let us assume x = 1 for the sake of 
simplicity (a perfect conditional cooperator).
16
 Suppose that the fraction of disclosers (type (b) or 
(c) mentioned above) is p100 [%] and that that of non-disclosers (type (a)) is (1 – p)100 [%]; 
and the fractions of types (b) and (c) among the disclosers are pcc100 [%] and (1 – pcc)100 
[%], respectively. Further, suppose that subject i correctly anticipates her peers’ behaviors and 
her belief on p and pcc is correct. Lastly, we assume that conditional cooperators contribute c1 in 
period 1, where no reputational information is available, and up to ?̃?, where ?̃? > 𝑐1, in the rest of 
periods.  
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 The basic implication we obtain for a material payoff maximizer’s behaviors does not change even if x < 1. 
15 
We can show that with this illustrative framework, it would be materially beneficial for i 
to mimic the behavior of a conditional cooperator by contributing ?̃? if p∙ pcc is sufficiently large. 
To see this, let us set up the Hamiltonian Ht,i as below: 
 Ht,i = 20 – ci,t + r∙(ci,t + p∙pcc∙Si,t∙1disclose,t) – f∙1disclose,t + λi,t+1∙∆Si,t. (2) 
Here, r = .8, ci,t is i’s contribution to the joint account, Si,t = ci,t-1 is i’s state (reputation), 1disclose,t 
is a dummy which equals 1 when i discloses; and 0, otherwise, f = 1 (a cost of disclosure), and λ 
i,t+1 is the shadow price of a unit of the reputation state in period t + 1. Note that ∆Si,t = Si,t+1 – Si,t 
= ci,t – Si,t. Applying the Maximum principle to (2), we find that the optimal controls are bang-
bang, characterized by the following conditions (e.g., Sethi and Thompson, 2006):
17
 
 
Condition 1: Material payoff maximizer i chooses to disclose in period t if Si,t > 1/(p∙pcc∙r)  
 in the C-RM treatment; and if Si,t ≠ 0 in the F-RM treatment. (3) 
Condition 2: Material payoff maximizer i chooses to contribute ?̃? in period t if p∙pcc > max{.25, 
1.25/?̃?} in the C-RM treatment; and if p∙pcc > .25 in the F-RM treatment.        (4) 
 
 We can make the same derivations for the C-Sorting and F-Sorting treatments. In these 
treatments, disclosers are matched with each other; and likewise non-disclosers are matched with 
each other. In this illustrative analysis, for simplicity, let us exclude the small possibility that a 
discloser is matched with a non-discloser. We then find the following optimal solutions:
18
 
  
Condition 1’: Material payoff maximizer i chooses to disclose in period t if Si,t > 1/(pcc∙r)  
 in the C-Sorting treatment; and if Si,t ≠ 0 in the F-Sorting treatment. (5) 
Condition 2’: Material payoff maximizer i chooses to contribute ?̃? in period t if pcc > max{.25, 
1.25/?̃?} in the C-Sorting treatment; and if pcc > .25 in the F-Sorting treatment.        (6) 
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 The adjoint equation is: ∆λi,t = λi,t+1 – λi,t = –Ht,i/Si,t = – p∙pcc∙r∙1disclose,t –λi,t+1∙(–1). In other words, λi,t = 
p∙pcc∙r∙1disclose,t (#1). The optimal control for c is bang-bang, because Ht,i/ci,t = –1 + r + λt+1 does not depend on ci,t., 
which means that ci,t = ?̃? if –1 + r + λt+1 > 0 (#2); and ci,t = 0 if –1 + r + λt+1 < 0. The optimal disclosure decision of 
subject i is dependent on Si,t. From Eq. (2), we find: i discloses if Si,t > f/(p∙pcc∙r) (#3) in the C-RM treatment; and if 
Si,t≠0 (#4) in the F-RM treatment. Conditions (#1), (#2) and (#3) in this footnote suggest that i chooses to 
contribute ?̃? if p∙pcc > max{.25, 1.25/?̃?} so long as ?̃? > 1 in the C-RM treatment. Conditions (#1), (#2) and (#4) in 
this footnote suggest that i chooses to contribute ?̃? if p∙pcc > .25 so long as ?̃? > 0 in the F-RM treatment. 
18
 The Hamiltonian in this case is: Ht,i = 20 – ci,t + r∙(ci,t + pcc∙Si,t∙1disclose,t) – f∙1disclose,t + λt+1∙∆Si,t. 
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We note that when the equality holds in condition (3) or (5), i would be indifferent between 
disclosing and not disclosing, in a given treatment. Likewise, when the equality holds in 
condition (4) or (6), i would be indifferent between contributing 0 and ?̃? in a given treatment. 
These considerations provide hypotheses in our experiment. First, as we expected, 
Conditions 1 and 1’ suggest that i has more incentives to disclose her past in the F-RM and F-
Sorting than in the C-RM and C-Sorting treatments, respectively, because disclosure can be 
made for free in the former treatments. Second and more importantly, these two conditions 
suggest that because of the sorting mechanism, the incentive to disclose is larger in the C-Sorting 
than in the C-RM treatment; and therefore i is more likely to choose to disclose (to enter the 
reputation community) in the former than in the latter treatment unless p = 1.
19
 
HYPOTHESIS 2: Incentives to Disclose in the Presence of Conditional Cooperators.  
(a) The percentages of those who disclose or sort into the reputation community are larger in the 
F-RM and F-Sorting than in the C-RM and C-Sorting treatments, respectively. (b) The same 
percentages are higher in the C-Sorting than in the C-RM treatment. (c) Almost all subjects 
choose to disclose or join the reputation community in the F-RM and F-Sorting treatments.
20
  
In deriving Conditions 1, 2, 1’ and 2’ (Hypotheses 2 and 3), we have assumed that the 
belief formed by i would be correct. The accuracy of subjects’ belief formation in the C-RM and 
F-RM treatments can be partially checked with elicited beliefs in the experiment.  
 The four conditions also have implications for subjects’ contribution behaviors. First, 
Conditions 2 and 2’ suggest that material payoff maximizer i has stronger incentives to mimic 
the behavior of conditional cooperator in the F-RM and F-Sorting than in the C-RM and C-
Sorting treatments, respectively, if ?̃? < 5, because a larger number of conditional cooperators is 
needed in the treatments with costly disclosure or sorting to compensate for the 1 ECU fee. 
?̃? < 5 is, however, not a strong condition. Second, comparisons between Conditions 1 and 1’, 
and also between Conditions 2 and 2’, suggest that i has stronger incentives to strategically build 
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 Notice that p∙pcc < pcc. 
20
 Notice that i chooses to disclose unless Si,t = 0 in these two treatments. 
17 
reputations as a conditional cooperator in C-Sorting and F-Sorting than in the C-RM and the F-
RM treatments, respectively. Note that Conditions 1’ and 2’ include pcc, not p∙pcc, unlike 
Conditions 1 and 2, because of the sorting mechanism.
21
  
 
HYPOTHESIS 3: Incentives to Contribute in the Presence of Conditional Cooperators.
22
 
(a) The negative impact of positive cost: C(F-RM) ≥ C(C-RM), and C(F-Sorting) ≥ C(C-Sorting). 
(b) The positive impact of sorting: C(C-Sorting) > C(C-FM), and C(F-Sorting) > C(F-RM).  
 
 All of the aforementioned considerations indicate that when pcc or p∙pcc is sufficiently 
large, subjects choose to disclose or join the reputation community and then keep high levels of 
cooperation, only with selfish motives. Thus, as an extreme situation, subjects do not need to 
exhibit non-standard preferences as discussed in Kreps et al. (1982). That is, if a sufficiently 
large number of subjects believe that a large percentage of their peers will disclose their past and 
choose (mimic) such conditional cooperation strategy, the beliefs can become self-fulfilling and 
cooperation may evolve even if all are selfish types.
23
  
Trust Attached to the Community: 
 Let us next study a possibility of evolution of cooperation through a contagious 
punishment strategy (grim-trigger) discussed above. Specifically, assume that all subjects, except 
subject i, have acted on and will continue to act on the following strategy in the C-RM and F-RM 
treatments: a subject chooses to disclose and contribute at least ?̃? in period t if (i) his partner in 
any period s {2, 3, …, t – 1} disclosed, had a reputation score Sj,s with Sj,s ≥ ?̃?, and contributed 
at least ?̃? in that period, and (ii) his partner in period t disclosed her last-period behavior and 
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 For example, if p = .50, the threshold values of pcc double in the C-RM and F-RM treatments, compared with the 
C-Sorting and F-Sorting treatments, respectively. 
22
 Here, C(.) indicates the average contribution to the joint account in a given treatment. 
23
 We note that mutual cooperation may be more likely to be achieved in the C-Sorting and F-Sorting than in the C-
RM and F-RM treatments, respectively, even if there are no material incentives to build cooperative reputations. As 
briefly mentioned earlier, there are past studies on the prevalence of non-selfish human types. It has been shown that 
people may be able to efficiently cooperate if they are matched with like-minded others with respect to the degree of 
cooperativeness (e.g., Gunnthorsdottir et al., 2007; Gächter and Thöni, 2010). In order to disentangle subjects’ 
selfish reputation-building motives from non-selfish motives, we classify subjects’ cooperation types by using the 
conditional contribution task (Fischbacher et al., 2001); and we then study the reputation building behavior for each 
cooperation type (see Section 4). 
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have a reputation score higher than or equal to ?̃?; the subject chooses not to disclose and 
contributes 0, otherwise. This strategy can be thought of as an extreme form of conditional 
contribution strategy. 
 In this situation, as illustrated in Appendix D, it is not materially beneficial for i to 
deviate from the same discriminating strategy before period 20 if ?̃? is not sufficiently large, and 
before period 17 even if ?̃? = 19 or 20. Numerical calculations indicate that one instance of 
defection results in quick breakdown of cooperation norms in a community. For instance, when i 
selects to contribute zero in period t, the percentage of 0-contributors (except subject i) in the 
community of 12 subjects becomes 95.5% in period t + 5; and it is 99.8% in period t + 6. Thus, 
unless their interactions are at very closer to the end, material payoff maximizer i would 
strategically keep contributing ?̃? by mimicking their peers’ cooperative behaviors. Thus, this 
theory suggests that cooperation unravels sharply in later periods. 
 The same analysis can be applied to the C-Sorting and F-Sorting treatments. The timing 
of deviation by material payoff maximizer i depends on the number of subjects in the reputation 
community. The timing of defection is earlier than the one in the C-RM and F-RM treatments 
unless the community size is 12, because the smaller the size of community is, the more quickly 
defection spreads across the community. 
 The validity of this possibility can be studied by looking at whether a subject stopped 
cooperating once one of their interaction partners contribute lower amounts to the joint account. 
Related Literature on Signaling and Endogenous Group Formation: 
Lastly, we discuss that the endogenous feature of disclosure or sorting may affect 
subjects’ behaviors, but the impact on the evolution of cooperation is not obvious in our 
experiment. On the one hand, the disclosure or sorting mechanism could serve as an additional 
device for subjects to send a signal of future cooperation (e.g., Tyran and Feld, 2006; Duffy and 
Feltovich, 2002).
24
 For an example of public goods games, Tyran and Feld (2006) show that 
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 Giving an opportunity to subjects to send signals also improve coordination among subjects in coordination games 
(e.g., Cooper et al., 1992; Kamei, 2016b). 
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collectively selecting a non-deterrent sanction rule in a one-shot public goods dilemma may 
encourage subjects to contribute more, compared with when the same rule is exogenously 
imposed, because voting for sanctions can serve as a signal that subjects would cooperate with 
others. For an example of prisoner’s dilemma games, Duffy and Feltovich (2002, 2006) show 
that a cheap-talk opportunity (where a subject in a pair can send a costless, nonbinding message 
to his/her pair partner) makes cooperation more likely.  
 But on the other hand, cooperation may be less likely to evolve even with the sorting 
mechanism present, according to the literature in endogenous group formation. The literature 
shows that when subjects are allowed to change their interaction groups at will (i.e., without their 
members’ agreement for moving-in or out, or without threat of exclusion), selfish individuals 
may attempt to join groups that have cooperators, aiming to exploit them, and as a result 
cooperation may be difficult to evolve in N-person dilemmas, where group size N > 2 (e.g., some 
treatments in Ahn et al., 2008 and 2009; Ehrhart and Keser, 1999).
25,26
 These findings may or 
may not be extended to our experimental setup, however. Our experimental design is different 
from this strand of past research in that subjects in our design do not engage in an N-person 
dilemma game with all group members (N persons). Instead, subjects who decide to join the 
reputation or anonymous community are randomly matched with another subject within their 
community and they then play the two-person public goods game with each other. Thus, 
although such chasing behaviors of malicious individuals may be prevalent, subjects are able to 
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 Cooperation is known to be more likely to evolve in dilemma games with fixed group size, rather than with 
variable group size, if individuals are provided with both an ability to choose with whom they interact and sufficient 
information on other players’ past behaviors (e.g., Page et al., 2005; Bayer, 2011; Kamei and Putterman, 2017). We 
note that the evolution of cooperation is likely to be seen in dilemma games with variable group size if entry to a 
new group requires the group members’ agreement (e.g., some treatments in Ahn et al., 2008 and 2009; Charness 
and Yang, 2014; Gallo and Yan, 2015), or informal sanctioning institutions are present (e.g., Gürerk et al., 2006; 
Rockenbach and Milinski, 2006; Fehr and Williams, 2013; Nicklisch et al., 2015). In our view, this positive 
evidence in these studies is partly caused by subject’s ability to enforce norms to less cooperative subjects with an 
agreement rule or a sanctioning institution, without hurting the reputation scores of punishers or high contributors. 
We also note that the impact of subjects’ partner selection on cooperation has also been reported in setups other than 
dilemma games (see, for example, Bernard et al. [2017] for a gift-exchange game). 
26
 Past research on sacrifice, which let subjects self-select among environments with different deviation games, finds 
that subjects achieve a high level of cooperation when they sacrifice the defector gains (e.g., Grimm and Mengel, 
2009; Aimone et al., 2013). However, unlike the past studies, subjects in our study are not provided an opportunity 
to sacrifice deviation gains, but are provided an opportunity to join an environment with the reputation mechanism. 
Except the presence of the reputation mechanism, not only subjects’ set of action choices but also their payoff 
structure is the same between the reputation and anonymous communities in our study.  
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adopt tit-for-tat-like discriminating strategies targeted to specific malicious members with the 
help of the reputation mechanisms, as discussed along with the conditional cooperation strategy 
above. As such, chasing behaviors by malicious individuals may be less beneficial in our setup, 
and cooperation may be sustained at a high level in the reputation community of the sorting 
treatments. Nevertheless, as already discussed, such punishment or protective actions lower a 
member’s own reputation. Accordingly, such actions may not be frequently taken. Even if such 
punishment is initiated by some subjects, there is a chance in which free riding spreads to other 
members as an epidemic and may quickly destroy the community’s cooperation norms.  
4. Results 
We first overview subjects’ contribution behaviors and their disclosure/sorting decisions 
in Section 4.1. We then study the treatment effects of information disclosure and sorting in 
Section 4.2. We then explore the driving forces behind the observed patterns of the data in 
Sections 4.3 to 4.7. 
4.1. Subjects’ Disclosure and Sorting Decisions, and their Average Contributions 
We first overview the trends of subjects’ disclosure decisions and average contribution 
amounts in the C-RM and F-RM treatments. Figure 2 reports the trends. The data shows that 
Hypothesis 1 does not hold. Even when there were no sorting opportunities, a non-negligible 
fraction of subjects chose to disclose their past, irrespective of whether disclosing was costly or 
not.
27
 The overall fraction of disclosers in the C-RM treatment was 23.0% (Table 1). As 
consistent with Hypothesis 2(a), the disclosure rate is significantly higher in the F-RM than in 
the C-RM treatment (Part II in Appendix Table C.1): the fraction of disclosers was 53.9% in the 
F-RM treatment (Table 1).
28
 The subjects’ average beliefs on the percentages of disclosers 
transited almost parallel to the actual percentages of disclosers in the C-RM and F-RM 
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 A regression analysis shows that subjects’ frequency of disclosing in each of the C-RM and F-RM treatments is 
significantly different from 0. See the estimates of the constant terms in Panel I, Appendix Table C.1. 
28
 See Panel II in Appendix Table C.1. 
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treatments (Panels I(c) and II(c) in Figure 2).
29
 The trends of average contributions in the C-RM 
and F-RM treatments are similar to each other: average contributions gradually declined over 
time as usual free-riding dynamics seen in the literature (e.g. Chaudhuri, 2011; Ledyard, 1995).  
 
Result 1: (i) Non-negligible fractions of subjects disclosed their past in the C-RM and F-RM 
treatments. Subjects correctly formed beliefs on the percentages of disclosers among peers. (ii) 
The average contributions in the C-RM and F-RM treatments both gradually declined over time. 
 
What were the effects of information revealed by subjects? In order to study the impact 
of (free or costly) information disclosure on the community’s cooperation norms, we conducted 
an additional treatment, which we call the “Baseline” treatment (Table 1). In the Baseline 
treatment, subjects were not allowed to disclose their past, were just randomly matched with 
another subject in a session, and then played the same two-person public goods game in each 
period (see Eq. (1) for the payoff consequence). The number of periods was 20 as in the other 
treatments. The rest of the design pieces were identical to the C-RM and F-RM treatments. As 
shown in Figure 2 [the dashed lines in Panels I(a) and II(a)], average contributions steadily 
declined from period to period in the BASELINE treatment, similar to the C-RM and F-RM 
treatments, but the level of cooperation in the former was much lower than that in the latter. The 
overall average contribution amount was 3.91 ECUs in the Baseline treatment (Table 1). This 
shows a positive effect of information disclosed in the C-RM and F-RM treatments. 
 
Result 1: (iii) The average contributions declined over time in the BASELINE treatment, similar 
to the C-RM and F-RM treatments; but the levels of cooperation were always much lower in the 
former treatment than in the latter two treatments. 
 
When the sorting device was present, significantly larger fractions of subjects disclosed 
their last-period contribution amounts to join the reputation community, compared with the 
corresponding random-matching treatments (again see Figure 2).
30
 52.8% and 70.7% of subjects 
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 This is consistent with the assumption we imposed in analyzing the reputation building behavior of a material 
payoff maximizer in the presence of conditional cooperators in Section 3. 
30
 See Panel I in Appendix Table C.1 for a statistical test. 
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in the C-Sorting and F-Sorting treatments, respectively, sorted into the reputation community 
(Table 1). The higher disclosure rate in the C-Sorting treatment, relative to the C-RM treatment, 
supports Hypothesis 2(b), but the higher disclosure rate in the F-Sorting treatment, relative to the 
F-RM treatment, is not consistent with Hypothesis 2(c).  
The pattern of subjects’ contribution behaviors is consistent with Hypothesis 3(b) for the 
C-Sorting and C-RM treatments, but not for the F-Sorting and F-RM treatments (Figure 2). Our 
date shows that the average contributions were much higher in the C-Sorting than in the C-RM 
treatment, but the levels of cooperation were similar between the F-Sorting and F-RM treatments. 
 
Result 2: (i) Significantly larger fractions of subjects disclosed their past in the C-Sorting and 
F-Sorting treatments, compared with the C-RM and F-RM treatments, respectively. (ii) The 
average contributions were higher in the C-Sorting than in the C-RM treatment. (iii) However, 
they were at similar levels between the F-Sorting and F-RM treatments. 
 
A close look at the data indicates that Result 2(ii) was driven by the high efficiency in the 
reputation community in the C-Sorting (Panel I(a) in Figure 2). Disclosers in the reputation 
community continuously contributed more than half of their endowment, ranging from around 10 
to 15 ECUs on average, to their joint accounts in the C-Sorting treatment. The high cooperation 
norms were well sustained, except the end periods (Andreoni, 1988).
31
 This pattern is clearly 
different from that in the C-RM treatment as well as in the anonymous community in the C-
Sorting treatment (Panel I(a), Figure 2).
32
 Although the disclosers who joined the reputation 
community had to pay one ECU for disclosure, the average per-period payoff in the C-Sorting 
treatment (26.01 ECUs) was much higher than that in the C-RM treatment (23.40 ECUs). We 
note that in the F-Sorting treatment, where the sorting process was free, the average contributions 
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 The trend of average contributions was overall in a declining trend due to the end game effects. However, there is 
no sign of decline in the reputation community in the C-Sorting treatment if we exclude a few end periods. For 
instance, the period number has a coefficient of .00043 when we perform a session fixed effect linear regression 
with standard errors clustered by session, where the period number is the only regressor, using session-average data. 
32
 The overall average contribution of the disclosers in the reputation community is 11.96 ECUs, which is much 
higher than the average contribution in the C-RM treatment, 6.02 ECUs. The average contribution in the anonymous 
community in the C-Sorting treatment was almost the same as the average contribution in the C-RM treatment 
(Table 1, Panel I(a) in Figure 2). See Table 2 for a statistical test of the difference. 
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in the reputation community hovered between 8 ECUs and 11 ECUs during the first ten periods 
and then between 6 ECUs and 9 ECUs during the second ten periods. As shown in Panel II(a) of 
Figure 2, the average contributions in the reputation community were also on average in a 
declining trend, unlike the ones in the C-Sorting treatment. We also note that low cooperation 
norms were commonly observed in the anonymous community in both of the two sorting 
treatments (Panels I(a) and II(a) in Figure 2).  
 
Result 2: (iv) Result 2(ii) was driven by strong cooperation norms well sustained in the 
reputation community in the C-Sorting treatment.  
 
In Section 4.2, we will formally study the treatment effects of information disclosure and 
sorting on subjects’ contribution behaviors. 
 
Disclosure and Last Period Contribution Behavior: 
 Lastly, we overview the dynamics of subjects’ disclosure or sorting decisions in each 
treatment. The disclosure rate (the percentage of the cases in which subjects chose to disclose 
[sort into the reputation community] in a random-matching [sorting] treatment) was in a 
decreasing trend in the C-RM treatment, but it stayed stable in the C-Sorting, F-RM and F-
Sorting treatments (Panels I(c) and II(c) in Figure 2). This is perhaps because disclosure involves 
a cost and no sorting mechanism is present in the C-RM treatment and thus subjects gradually 
learn that it is not worth one ECU. 
Subjects’ disclosure decisions in period t were largely affected by their own contribution 
behaviors in period t – 1, rather than their matched partners’ decisions in period t – 1. As shown 
in Appendix Table C.2, the lower amounts disclosers contributed to the joint account in period t 
– 1, the more likely they were to become non-disclosers in period t in all the four treatments. 
Similarly, the higher amounts non-disclosers contributed to the joint account in period t – 1, the 
more likely they switched to become disclosers in period t in the C-RM, F-Sorting and F-RM 
24 
treatments.
33
 This suggests that subjects’ disclosure or sorting decisions were more motivated by 
own intentions to cooperate in the future, or hide low contribution histories or escape from 
exploited partners, rather than passive motives based on partners’ action choices taken to the 
subjects. Some subjects switched back and forth between the two communities in the C-Sorting 
and F-Sorting treatments (Appendix Figure C.1). On average 10% to 20% of subjects moved 
from the reputation to the anonymous communities; and similar fractions of subjects moved from 
the anonymous to the reputation communities in each period.   
4.2. Treatment Effects of Voluntary Information Disclosure and Sorting 
 Our approach to study the treatment differences is to estimate a regression model 
(columns (1) and (2) in Table 2), in which the dependent variable is (session-average) 
contribution amounts in each period. Independent variables include treatment dummies, and the 
reference group is contribution amounts in the Baseline treatment. The period number {= 2, 3, …, 
20} is also controlled for in column (2). The estimation shows that the impact of information 
disclosure or sorting depends on the frequency of disclosing. The impact of costly disclosure is 
not significant in the C-RM treatment, whose disclosure rate was 23.0%, the lowest of the four 
treatments (see the coefficient estimates of the C-RM dummy). In contrast, in the F-RM, C-
Sorting, and F-Sorting treatments, whose disclosure rates were more than 50%, the impact of 
free disclosure or that of sorting, whether costly or free, is significant. Overall, there were no 
treatment differences in the level of cooperation between the three treatments. 
 
 Considering that some subjects in the C-RM and C-Sorting treatments paid fees for 
disclosure and sorting, respectively, we also performed the same regressions while setting the 
dependent variable as (session-average) payoffs in each period. As shown in Appendix Table C.3, 
we found significant effects of voluntary disclosure in the F-RM treatment and sorting in the C-
Sorting and F-Sorting treatments in increasing payoffs (see columns (1) and (2) of Table C.3). 
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 Last-period partners’ contribution behaviors did not significantly affect subjects’ disclosure behaviors, except for 
disclosers in the F-Sorting treatment. The disclosers in the F-Sorting treatment were more likely to stay in the 
reputation community in the following period, the higher amounts their matched partners contributed. 
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Result 3: (i) Costly disclosure in the C-RM treatment does not either enhance cooperation or 
increase payoffs significantly. However, (ii) free disclosure in the F-RM treatment and sorting in 
the C-Sorting and F-Sorting treatments have significant impact on raising people’s levels of 
cooperation and payoffs. 
 
Result 2(iv) is also confirmed by a regression analysis. As shown in column (3), Table 2, 
the average contribution is significantly higher in the C-Sorting reputation community than in the 
C-Sorting anonymous community or in the C-RM treatment. This picture changes when 
disclosure does not involve a cost. The average contribution in the F-Sorting reputation 
community is not significantly different from that in the F-RM treatment, although the former is 
significantly higher than that in the F-Sorting anonymous community. The same also holds when 
subjects’ average payoffs, instead of their average contributions, are compared (see column (3) 
in Appendix Table C.3). 
 
Result 3: (iii) The average contribution is significantly higher in the reputation than in the 
anonymous community, regardless of whether the sorting is free or costly. (iv) When disclosing 
information involves a cost, the average contribution in the reputation community is significantly 
higher than that in the random-matching community of the C-RM treatment. 
 
 We note that the average contribution in the reputation community is significantly higher 
at the 10% level in the C-Sorting than in the F-Sorting treatment (column (3), Table 2). However 
the average payoffs in the reputation community are not significantly different between the two 
treatments (column (3), Table C.3) due to the costs spent by disclosers in the C-Sorting treatment. 
4.3. Subjects’ Disclosure Decisions and Action Choices in the C-RM and F-RM treatments 
 This subsection is devoted to an analysis of subjects’ behaviors in the C-RM and F-RM 
treatment which may have driven Results 1 to 3. 
Disclosers’ High Willingness to Contribute:  
26 
The difference in the frequency of subjects’ disclosure (Table 1) and Result 3 seem to 
suggest that the contribution behaviors of disclosers can be different from those of non-disclosers. 
In Section 4.3, we will first explore the relationship between subjects’ disclosure decisions and 
their action choices. Figure 3 reports the average contribution amounts by disclosure decision in 
the C-RM and F-RM treatments. It indicates that disclosers on average contributed 11.0 ECUs 
and 10.7 ECUs in the C-RM and F-RM treatments, respectively, both of which are significantly 
higher than the average contribution amounts of non-disclosers in these two treatments (which 
are 4.5 ECUs and 4.1 ECUs).
34
 These suggest that subjects’ disclosure decisions and their 
contribution amounts are closely linked to each other as assumed in the discussions in Section 3. 
 
Result 4: Disclosers are significantly more likely than non-disclosers to contribute large 
amounts to the joint accounts in the C-RM and F-RM treatments. 
 
Cooperation Types and Strategic Reputation Building Behaviors: 
Not only in the F-RM but also in the C-RM treatments, our data shows that some selfish 
subjects strategically contributed positive amounts to the joint account to build cooperative 
reputations and then disclosed the contribution amounts in the following periods. The conditional 
contribution schedule (Fischbacher et al., 2001) elicited from each subject can be used for this 
analysis.
35
 In our detailed analysis below, we focus on two types: “conditional cooperators” and 
“free riders.” Similar to Fischbacher et al., we define those whose own contribution amounts and 
the others’ average contribution amounts are significantly positively correlated at least at the 5% 
level (according to spearman’s ρ correlation coefficients) as the conditional cooperators. We 
define those whose own contribution amounts are always zero as free riders. Based on these 
classification criteria, 58.3% and 12.5% of subjects are classified as conditional cooperators and 
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 We conducted a linear regression (with robust standard errors clustered by session) in which the dependent 
variable is subject i’s contribution amount in period t and independent variables includes a dummy which equals 1 if 
i disclosed and 0 if i did not disclose his or her last-period contribution amount. Individual fixed effects were added 
to control for the panel structure. We found that the dummies obtain significantly positive coefficients at the 5% and 
10% level in the C-RM and F-RM treatments, respectively.  
35
 The average conditional contribution schedule of the overall subject population group falls in line with the 
standard conditional cooperator type: own contribution amounts are significantly positively increasing in the others’ 
average contribution amounts (Appendix Figure C.2). 
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free riders, respectively, in the C-RM treatment. Likewise, 63.6% and 20.5% of subjects are 
classified as conditional cooperators and free riders, respectively, in the F-RM treatment. 
The percentages of conditional cooperators and free riders who costly disclosed their past 
in the C-RM treatment are on average 25.8% and 21.1%, respectively. These two percentages in 
the F-RM treatment are 55.3% and 50.3%, respectively. Thus, a non-negligible fraction of free 
riders did disclose their last-period action choices, like conditional cooperators. 
The fit of the classification method by Fischbacher et al. can be examined by looking at 
subjects’ contribution amounts in period 20 (the final period of the experiment). In period 20, a 
subject would contribute nothing if he or she is purely selfish. Panels 1(b) and 2(b) of Figure 3 
report the average contributions in period 20. Two clear features were found, among others. First, 
disclosers on average contributed more than non-disclosers even when only period 20 is 
considered.
36
 The average contributions of disclosers were 9.2 ECUs and 7.4 ECUs in the C-RM 
and F-RM treatments, respectively. Second, and as importantly, the average contributions of free 
riders in period 20 were much lower than those of conditional cooperators. For instance, the 
average contributions of free riders in the C-RM treatment were 0.0 ECUs when choosing to 
disclose (0.6 ECUs when not disclosing their last-period actions). The second observation 
implies that the classified types are good indicators to measure subjects’ contribution behavior.  
Panels 1(a) and 2(a) of Figure 3 report average contribution amounts across all periods 
but periods 1 and 20 by disclosure decision. It indicates that not only conditional cooperators but 
also free riders contributed large amounts in the C-RM and F-RM treatments when they 
disclosed their last-period contribution amounts. The differences in the average contribution 
between conditional cooperators and free riders are not significant in both of the treatments (see 
Wald test results in Appendix Table C.4). This suggests that as discussed in Section 3, some free 
riders indeed mimicked the behavior of conditional cooperators by strategically contributing 
large amounts and disclosing them in the C-RM and F-RM treatments.  
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 The ratios of the average contribution by disclosers to that by non-disclosers are around 2.9 and 8.2 in the C-RM 
and F-RM treatments, respectively (see the “All subjects” bars in the two panels). 
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Result 5: (a) Regardless of disclosure decision, free riders contributed very little in period 20, 
compared with conditional cooperators, in the C-RM and F-RM treatments. (b) However, free 
riders contributed almost similar to conditional cooperators during the course of their plays 
(periods before period 20) when they disclosed the last-period contribution amounts. 
 
 Why did some conditional cooperators choose not to disclose? One possibility is that they 
were pessimistic about their peers’ contribution behaviors. As shown in Figure C.4, we partially 
confirm this possibility: conditional cooperators who less frequently disclosed formed lower 
beliefs on their matched peers’ contribution behaviors, compared with the same types who 
frequently disclosed (Panels a and c). However, the differences in the average belief are not 
significant in both the C-RM and F-RM treatments. Instead, Figure C.4 indicates that among 
conditional cooperators, infrequent disclosers contributed significantly less than frequent 
disclosers, when they selected to disclose, in these two treatments. This seems to suggest that 
some conditional cooperators attempted to exploit other cooperators, instead of encouraging 
others to select conditional cooperative strategies. This may mean that there are other aspects in 
human cooperativeness that are not captured by the classification method by Fischbacher et al. 
 In summary, whether conditional cooperators or free riders, some subjects attempted to 
build cooperative reputations in the C-RM and F-RM treatments. The difference in the efficiency 
between the C-RM and F-RM treatments can be interpreted that the cost of disclosure 
discouraged a large percentage of subjects from disclosing and cooperating with their peers.  
4.4. Subjects’ Sorting Decisions and Action Choices in the C-Sorting and F-Sorting treatments  
As discussed, subjects successfully cooperated with each other in the reputation 
community, but not in the anonymous community, in the two sorting treatments. What drove the 
successful cooperation achieved in the reputation community? With a closer look, we found that 
although the level of cooperation was higher in the reputation than in the anonymous community 
in the F-Sorting treatment, the cooperation norms in the reputation community was lower, 
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compared with the C-Sorting reputation community. Why did the performance of the reputation 
community differ between the two treatments? This section will study these questions. 
Composition of Cooperation Types by the Community: 
The C-Sorting and F-Sorting treatments have sorting mechanisms. One possible answer 
to the above two questions is that the composition of cooperation types are different between the 
reputation and anonymous communities.
37
 However, our data does not support this hypothesis. 
The percentages of conditional cooperators and free riders are not significantly different between 
the reputation and anonymous communities in both the C-Sorting and F-Sorting treatments 
(Appendix Figure C.3). Moreover, as similar to Result 5(b), free riders contributed amounts 
similar to conditional cooperators in the reputation community.
38
 Some free riders’ reputation 
building behavior is not surprising, particularly because they were assured to be paired with 
other disclosers. These analyses suggest that the stronger cooperation norms emerged in the 
reputation community, especially in the C-Sorting treatment, were not due to the self-selection of 
cooperation-oriented subjects.  
 
Result 6: The percentages of conditional cooperators and free riders in the reputation 
community are not significantly different from those in the anonymous community in the C-
Sorting and F-Sorting treatments. Moreover, the contribution behaviors of conditional 
cooperators are not significantly different from those of free riders in the sorting treatments. 
 
Subjects’ Action Choices and Beliefs on their Peers’ Behaviors: 
The next possible factor that was behind the high efficiency in the reputation community 
is subjects’ higher beliefs on their matched disclosers’ contribution amounts.  
First, our data shows that subjects’ beliefs on their matched partners’ contribution 
amounts significantly affected their own contribution behavior. This is true for both the two 
sorting treatments and the two random-matching treatments (Table 3). Panels I(b) and II(b) in 
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 It has been demonstrated that subjects cooperate significantly more if they are grouped with like-minded 
cooperative types in dilemma games (e.g., Gunnthorsdottir et al., 2007; Gächter and Thöni, 2010). 
38
 Conditional cooperators and free riders on average contributed 11.4 ECUs and 10.2 ECUs, respectively, to the 
joint accounts in the C-Sorting reputation community. Conditional cooperators and free riders on average 
contributed 9.3 ECUs and 7.5 ECUs, respectively, to the joint accounts in the F-Sorting reputation community. 
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Figure 2 report the trends of the subjects’ beliefs in the C-Sorting and F-Sorting treatments. The 
data revealed that disclosers’ contribution amounts fluctuated parallel to their beliefs on matched 
partners’ contributions (see the red lines with diamonds in Panels (a) and (b)).39 The similar 
holds for non-disclosers (see the blue line with triangles in Panels (a) and (b)).
40
 A regression 
analysis confirms that contribution amounts and subjects’ beliefs are significantly positively 
correlated for each of disclosers and non-disclosers in both the C-Sorting and F-Sorting 
treatments (columns (3) to (6) in Table 3(a)). The highly positive correlations between own 
actions and the beliefs resonates with the idea that people experience psychological satisfaction 
from mutual cooperation (e.g., Fehr and Gächter, 2000, 2002; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Falk et 
al., 2005; Kamei and Putterman, forthcoming; Rilling et al., 2002; Decety et al., 2004). The 
impact that subjects’ beliefs have on their own contribution behaviors is similarly observed in the 
C-RM and F-RM treatments (columns (1) and (2) in Table 3(a)).  
Second, our data shows that subjects formed beliefs based on their matched partners’ last-
period contribution amounts when the past contribution amounts were revealed to them. Table 
3(b) reports a regression analysis in which the dependent variable is subject i’s belief on her 
period t partner’s contribution amount and independent variables include the partner’s reputation 
score. First, in the C-RM and F-RM treatments, subjects formed significantly higher beliefs 
when they were matched with disclosers than when they were matched with non-disclosers. In 
addition, when subjects were matched with disclosers, their beliefs were positively correlated 
with the disclosers’ last-period contribution amounts (Panel (b1)). Second, likewise, in the 
reputation communities of the two sorting treatments, significantly positive correlations between 
disclosers’ beliefs and period t partners’ last-period contribution amounts were observed (Panel 
(b2)). Panel I(b) of Figure 2, for example, shows that the much higher beliefs formed by 
                                                          
39
 The disclosers’ average belief in the C-Sorting treatment was 12.15 ECUs, which was only .2 ECUs higher than 
the average of their own contribution amounts. Likewise, the disclosers’ average belief in the F-Sorting treatment 
was 8.75 ECUs, which was only .28 ECUs lower than the average of their own contribution amount. 
40
 For instance, the non-disclosers in the C-Sorting treatment on average believed that their partners would 
contribute 7.10 ECUs, which was only a little higher than the non-disclosers’ average contribution, but it is not 
significantly different from the actual contribution amount. 
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disclosers in the C-Sorting treatment are almost parallel to the high contribution amounts their 
matched partners made in the last period which were informed to disclosers. 
These analyses suggest that the success of high efficiency in the reputation community 
may lie on the sorting mechanism where disclosers are matched with other disclosers, because 
the sorting mechanism helps subjects keep high beliefs on their partners’ contribution behaviors.  
 
Result 7: (a) Subjects’ contribution amounts and beliefs on their partners were significantly 
positively correlated in all treatments. (b) Disclosers’ beliefs and their partners’ last-period 
contribution amounts were significantly positively correlated in the C-Sorting and F-Sorting 
reputation communities. (c) Subjects formed significantly higher beliefs when they were matched 
with disclosers than otherwise; and the beliefs on the disclosers’ contribution amounts were 
significantly positively correlated with the partners’ last-period contribution amounts in the C-
RM and F-RM treatments. 
 
Performance Differences in the Reputation Community between the Two Sorting Treatments: 
As discussed earlier, Panels I(a) and II(a) of Figure 2 indicate a difference in the 
evolution of cooperation in the reputation community between the C-Sorting and F-Sorting 
treatments. These figures and Result 7 suggest that the difference in the level of cooperation 
between the two treatments could be caused by the difference in subjects’ beliefs on the partners’ 
cooperativeness, caused by the difference in the partners’ last-period contribution amounts. A 
likely reason for this difference is the free entrance to the reputation community in the F-Sorting 
treatment. In the literature of endogenous group formation, as discussed in Section 3, it is known 
that selfish individuals may chase cooperative ones attempting to exploit them and as a result 
cooperation may easily collapse (Ahn et al., 2008, 2009; Ehrhart and Keser, 1999). The lack of 
the cost for sorting in the F-Sorting treatment may strengthen this negative effect of mobility.  
Appendix Figure C.5 reports subject-by-subject average contribution amounts in the 
reputation community in the C-Sorting and F-Sorting treatments. This shows that most subjects 
frequently switched back and forth between the reputation and anonymous communities. 
However, more subjects in the F-Sorting treatments frequently joined the reputation community, 
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compared with the C-Sorting treatment. Appendix Figure C.6 reports the history of each 
subject’s sorting decisions. It reveals that unlike the C-Sorting treatment, most subjects in the F-
Sorting treatment switched back and forth between the two communities with different cycles.
41
 
Despite that on average around 25% to 35% of subjects moved between the reputation and 
anonymous communities in each period for both the two sorting treatments (see Appendix Figure 
C.1 and the discussion in Section 4.1), it seems that only a small set of subjects in the C-Sorting 
treatment switched back and forth between the reputation and anonymous communities. 
The percentages of subjects who joined the reputation community more than or equal to 
ten times (except period 20), which we call the “frequent disclosers” hereafter, are 52.3% and 
77.3% in the C-Sorting and F-Sorting treatments, respectively. The two percentages are 
significantly different (Two-sample test of proportions, two-sided p-value = .0141). Appendix 
Figure C.5 also indicates that a larger percentage of the frequent disclosers contributed large 
amounts to the joint account in the C-Sorting treatment, compared with the F-Sorting treatment. 
For example, the percentages of the frequent disclosers that contributed amounts less than 10 
ECUs are 11.4% and 43.2% in the C-Sorting and F-Sorting treatments, respectively. The small 
percentage in the C-Sorting treatment is striking. The two percentages are significantly different 
(Two-sample test of proportions, two-sided p-value = .0107). These analyses suggest that a 
significantly larger fraction of subjects had intentions to exploit high contributors and joined the 
reputation community when joining is free than when it is costly, and they sometimes escaped 
into the anonymous community after engaging in such exploitable behaviors. 
 
Result 8: A significantly larger percentage of those who attempt to exploit high contributors 
joined the reputation community in the F-Sorting than in the C-Sorting treatment. 
 
Result 8 implies that the reputation community can be more unstable in the F-Sorting 
than in the C-Sorting treatment because of the discriminating strategies [Results 7(a) and (b)]; 
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 There is also quantitative evidence to support this observation. First, disclosers in period t – 1 in the C-Sorting 
treatment were more likely to stay as a discloser in period t, compared with those in the F-Sorting treatment 
(Remark in Appendix Figure C.6). Second, non-disclosers in the C-Sorting treatment did not switch to a discloser in 
the following period when they contributed large amounts to the joint account (columns (a3) in Appendix Table C.2). 
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and some subjects’ low contribution events would spread to other subjects. This contagion 
process can explain the difference in the cooperation dynamics in the reputation community 
between the C-Sorting and F-Sorting treatments. 
Lastly, we note that although the efficiency was significantly higher in the reputation than 
in the anonymous community in the C-Sorting treatment, a non-negligible fraction of the 
subjects stayed away from the reputation community. This phenomenon cannot be explained by 
cooperation types (Result 6). What may account for this phenomenon? The data shows that the 
reputation community in the C-Sorting treatment, unlike the F-Sorting treatment, may have 
attracted subjects with more optimistic expectation about their peers’ action choices (see 
Appendix Table C.6). Specifically, the frequent members of the reputation community had 
higher expectations about their peers’ contribution amounts than those who less frequently joined 
did in the same reputation community.
42,43
 This is suggestive evidence only, however, since the 
effect is no longer significant once session clustering is added in Table C.6. 
  
4.5. Little Reliance on the Contagious Punishment Strategy 
 Our results in Sections 4.3 and 4.4 are consistent with the idea that some subjects are 
conditional cooperators and selfish types mimic the behaviors of conditional cooperators. We 
discussed in Section 3 that cooperation could evolve also with the contagious punishment 
strategy (grim trigger strategy). As will be briefly reported in this subsection, a close look at each 
subject’s history of action choices suggests that no subjects followed such a strict strategy. 
 If a subject follows the contagious strategy as described in Section 3, the subject would 
become a 0-contributor from period t if (a) her partner j in period k, where k < t, contributed 0 in 
that period, (b) the partner disclosed but had a reputation score of 0 (i.e., Sj,k = 0), or (c) her 
partner was a non-discloser. In our experiment, the likelihood that a subject encountered a non-
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 In the regression analysis, we used each subject’s session-average beliefs on their matched peers’ contribution 
amounts in the reputation community or anonymous community as the dependent variable. The independent variable 
includes the total number of periods in which the subject joined the reputation community before period 20.  
43
 Also see Panel (b) of Appendix Figure C.4. These may mean that subjects’ beliefs on their peers’ behaviors 
determined subjects’ sorting decisions. However, we acknowledge that the direction of causality may be opposite: 
subjects’ beliefs on the high cooperation norms in the reputation community were mainly formed by their 
experiences in the reputation community (Result 7). 
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discloser or a discloser with a low reputation score, or the subject was defected by zero 
contributions from her partner was large. A calculation shows that if subjects followed the 
contagious strategy, all subjects would have become 0-contributors from periods 5, 9, 9 and 6 in 
the C-RM, F-RM, C-Sorting and F-Sorting treatments, respectively. This was clearly not the case 
in the experiment (see Figure 2). We also checked how many subjects in each treatment turned to 
complete 0-contributors after experiencing at least one of the three events above, (a), (b) and (c). 
In this calculation, we excluded subjects who acted on the “always to defect” strategy during the 
entire experiment.
44
 We found that no subjects in each of the four treatments became complete 0-
contributors after experiencing such events the first time. 
4.6. Cost of Soring or Information? 
The performance in the reputation community was clearly different from that in the 
anonymous community in the C-Sorting treatment. It also performed much better than in the C-
RM treatment. As a result, the C-Sorting treatment has significantly higher efficiency than the C-
RM treatment (Result 2(ii)). This can be due to two effects: (A) the impact of information and 
(B) the impact of the cost to be matched with like-minded others. If the presence of a sorting cost 
is one key factor for the superior performance of the C-Sorting treatment, then a highly efficient 
community may emerge and subjects may enjoy high cooperation norms in that community, 
even if we eliminate the element of the reputation mechanism from the C-Sorting treatment. 
However, there is also a possibility that cooperation may not evolve if reputational information is 
removed, because then subjects cannot distinguish between high and low contributors. In order 
to divide the impact of costly sorting into impact (A) and impact (B), we conducted an additional 
treatment, called “C-Sorting-N” (Costly Sorting, No Disclosure). In this additional treatment, 
each subject who paid one ECU was matched with another who paid one ECU. However, their 
last-period contribution amounts were not revealed (see Appendix E for the instructions). We 
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 The number of subjects who acted on the “always to defect” strategy was much less in the experiment. There were 
four, two, zero, and one subject(s) in the C-RM, F-RM, C-Sorting, and F-Sorting treatments, respectively. 
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call the community of those who paid (did not pay) the fee the “paid community” (“non-paid 
community”) in the paper. The rest of the design was identical to the C-Sorting treatment. 
On average 53.6% of subjects, whose percentage is almost the same as that in the C-
Sorting treatment, paid the fee to join the paid community (Table 1). As in the C-Sorting 
treatment, the average contributions were clearly different between the paid community and the 
non-paid community (Table 1, Figure 4). The difference in the level of cooperation is significant 
and huge, around 7 ECUs (Table 1, columns (3) and (4) in Appendix Table C.7(I)). Nevertheless, 
the average contribution is 2.51 ECUs lower in the paid community than in the C-Sorting 
reputation community (see again Table 1). As for the treatment differences, the average 
contribution in the C-Sorting-N treatment is 6.31 ECUs, around 61% higher than that in the 
Baseline treatment.
45
 However, the former is significantly lower than that in the C-Sorting 
treatment (see columns (1) and (2) in Panel I, Appendix Table C.7). Qualitatively the same 
treatment difference is also found when average payoffs are compared between the C-Sorting 
and C-Sorting-N treatments (see columns (1) and (2) in Panel II, Appendix Table C.7). 
In summary, these additional analyses suggest that there is positive impact of a cost to be 
matched with like-minded others; however, the presence of the reputation mechanism is crucial 
for the performance in the C-Sorting treatment. 
 
Result 9: (i) In the C-Sorting-N treatment, not only average contributions but also average 
payoffs were significantly higher in the paid than in the non-paid community. However, (ii) as a 
whole, the average contribution and average payoff were both significantly lower in the C-
Sorting-N than in the C-Sorting treatment. 
 
4.7. Significance of Reputation Mechanisms 
 We found that the distributions of cooperation types were not different between the 
reputation and anonymous communities (Section 4.4). We discussed that the free entrance to the 
reputation community may have encouraged some subjects to exploit cooperative subjects in the 
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 The difference is significant, according to a regression analysis, only when the Period Number variable is 
controlled for (see columns (1) and (2) in Panel I, Appendix Table C.7). 
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reputation community in the F-Sorting treatment. But what happens if there is no anonymous 
community, subjects are not allowed to switch between communities and are always forced to 
disclose their past in the interactions? If the cost of mobility between the two communities and 
the reputation mechanism are the key reasons for the high efficiency in the reputation community 
in the C-Sorting treatment, subjects could achieve a high level of cooperation as a whole once we 
eliminate such mobility, under the condition in which the reputation mechanism is present. In 
this section, as a last analysis, we report the results from an additional treatment to check the 
impact of reputation mechanisms without mobility. We call this additional treatment the “Info” 
(“Information Automatic Disclosure”) treatment; and we compare it with the C-Sorting treatment. 
At the onset of the additional sessions, subjects were randomly assigned to a community whose 
size was six (the community size is on average six also in the reputation community of the C-
Sorting treatment) and the community composition was kept the same during the entire 
experiment. Two sessions, each with 12 subjects, were conducted so that we can obtain four 
independent community data as in the C-Sorting reputation community. The number of 
interactions was 20. In each period, subjects were randomly matched with another in their own 
community and played the same public goods game (Eq. (1)). From period 2, each subject’s last 
period contribution amount was always automatically revealed to their own partner.  
  As shown in Figure 5, the trend of average contributions in the Info treatment was very 
similar to that in the C-Sorting reputation community. The average contribution across all 
periods was 11.52 ECUs, which is almost the same as that in the C-Sorting reputation 
community – 11.96 ECUs (Table 1). This confirms our earlier discussion that the easiness of 
mobility and the presence of an anonymous community may lead to a decline of cooperation 
norms. Nevertheless, the average contribution in the C-Sorting anonymous communities is 
significantly lower, compared with the Info treatment (column (3) in Appendix Table C.8(I)). As 
a result, the difference in average contribution between the C-Sorting and Info treatments was 
more than 2 ECUs, although the treatment difference is not significant (columns (1) and (2) in 
Table C.8(I)). Moreover, the average payoff is significantly higher in the Info than in the C-
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Sorting treatment at the 10% level due to some subjects’ cost spent in joining the reputation 
community and the presence of the inefficiency anonymous community (columns (1) and (2) in 
Table C.8(II)). 
 
Result 10: (i) The average contribution in the Info treatment is at almost similar levels to that in 
the C-Sorting reputation community, but the former is significantly higher than that in the C-
Sorting anonymous treatment. Due to the presence of an inefficient anonymous community and 
the cost spent in sorting, (ii) the average payoff is weakly significantly higher in the Info than in 
the C-Sorting treatment. 
 
 Result 10 underscores negative aspects of people’s endogenous sorting and voluntary 
information disclosure and potentially a desire to have some mechanisms to overcome the 
observed inefficiency in a community. 
5. Conclusions 
This study let subjects play a finitely repeated two-person public goods game where each 
subject is given an option to disclose their past behavior. Our experiment showed that voluntary 
information disclosure is not enough to enhance cooperation if disclosure involves a cost and a 
sorting mechanism is not present. However, it is indeed helpful for the evolution of cooperation 
if the disclosure is made for free or if subjects are able to join a community with the reputation 
mechanism through information disclosure. A close look at the data revealed that the failure of 
cooperation with costly information disclosure was caused by sufficiently low disclosure rates 
and the non-disclosers’ opportunistic behaviors, among others. When subjects were given an 
opportunity to sort into the reputation community, a stable size of reputation community 
emerged and those who joined the reputation community cooperated with each other at high 
levels. Nevertheless, the high level of cooperation in the reputation community diminished if 
sorting into that community was cost-free because those with malicious intentions to exploit high 
cooperators were more likely to join the reputation community, compared with when sorting was 
costly. Moreover, we found that the presence of the reputation mechanism was crucial for such 
positive impact of sorting, but mobility to an anonymous community encouraged some subjects 
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to behave opportunistically although they could have cooperated with each other if they had been 
forced to always disclose. 
We remark that the emergence of an anonymous community in the sorting treatments fits 
observations in our real life as we see communities (e.g., online platforms) both with and without 
reputation mechanisms. Our detailed analysis suggests that people’s endogenous choices 
generate these two kinds of communities, although subjects can cooperate with each other if they 
are forced to always act with reputation mechanisms. What kind of additional institutions on top 
of the reputation mechanism and sorting would be helpful in reversing such subjects from the 
anonymous environment to the reputation environment and encouraging them to cooperate with 
each other? This question would be an interesting direction for future research.   
As mentioned earlier, our paper has a useful contribution in the large body of literature on 
rational cooperation in finitely repeated dilemmas, on reputation mechanisms, and on 
endogenous group formation. We note that our paper also contributes to the literature on 
voluntary information disclosure which shows that disclosing private information of products or 
firms may raise the valuation of them. For instance, Lewis (2011) shows that on eBay motors, 
there is positive impact of voluntary information disclosure (e.g., photos) on the prices of used 
cars in auctions. Our experimental setup uses a simultaneous public goods game and it can 
describe a real-world exchange in which the interaction is taking place while both sides do not 
know the exact value they will get from the other. This kind of interaction has been increasingly 
popular in our life (e.g., the sharing economy such as Uber). This simultaneous setup is different 
from the above marketplace example where sellers move first and buyers move next. Our data 
implies that voluntary information disclosure or sorting also helps lead to socially beneficial 
relationships in some simultaneous-move transactions.  
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Table 1. Summary of Treatments 
 
Treatment 
name 
Costs for 
disclosing or 
sorting  
Matching 
Protocol 
The number 
of sessions 
(subjects) 
Fraction of disclosers 
or those who joined 
the reputation 
community 
Average contribution 
All data 
reputation/paid 
community 
anonymous/non-
paid community 
[Main treatments:]       
C-Sorting 1 ECU 
Sorting: Each discloser (non-
discloser) is matched with another 
discloser (non-discloser). 
4 (44) 52.8% 
9.28 
(46.4%) 
11.96 
(59.8%) 
6.15 
(30.7%) 
C-RM 1 ECU 
Random Matching: Each subject 
is randomly matched with another 
subject. 
4 (48) 23.0% 
6.02 
(30.1%) 
---- ---- 
F-Sorting 0 ECUs 
Sorting: Each discloser (non-
discloser) is matched with another 
discloser (non-discloser). 
4 (44) 70.7 % 
7.89 
(39.4%) 
8.78  
(43.9%) 
5.50 
(27.5%) 
F-RM 0 ECUs 
Random Matching: Each subject 
is randomly matched with another 
subject. 
4 (44) 53.9% 
7.62 
(38.1%) 
---- ---- 
[Additional treatments:]       
Baseline n.a. 
Random Matching: Each subject 
is randomly matched with another 
subject. 
4 (44) n.a. 
3.91 
(19.6%) 
---- 
3.91 
(19.6%) 
C-Sorting-N 1 ECU 
Sorting: Each person who paid 
(did not pay) is matched with 
another that paid (did not pay). 
4 (44) 53.6% 
6.31 
(31.5%) 
9.45 
(47.1%) 
2.35 
(11.7%) 
Info n.a. 
Random Matching: Each subject 
is randomly matched with another 
subject. 
2 (24) n.a. 
11.52 
(57.6%) 
11.52 
(57.6%) 
---- 
Total   26 (292)     
        
 
Notes: C-Sorting = Costly Sorting. F-Sorting = Free Sorting. C-RM = Costly Disclosure, Random Matching. F-RM = Free Disclosure, Random Matching. C-
Sorting-N = Costly Soring, No Disclosure. Info = Information Automatic Disclosure.  
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Figure 1. Schematic Diagram 
 
(a) C-Sorting and F-Sorting treatments 
 
(b) C-RM and F-RM treatments 
Notes: At the onset of the experiment, subjects go through the task to elicit conditional cooperation types. There is no disclosure decision stage in period 1. In the 
allocation stage, subjects in all treatments are asked to state beliefs on their matched partner’s contribution amount in a given period. In the C-RM and F-RM 
treatments, subjects are also asked to answer guess on how many persons disclosed immediately after their disclosure decision in a given period.  
Period tPeriod t - 1
1st decision Subject i joins the
reputation community
by disclosing last-
period contribution
Subject i joins the annonymous 
community by not disclosing 
last-period contribution
Pairs are randomly 
formed within the 
reputation 
community
Pairs are randomly 
formed within the 
annonymous 
community
2nd decision
Public goods
game with a 
partner
Public goods
game with a 
partner
Subject i joins the reputation 
community by disclosing last-
period contribution
Pairs are randomly 
formed within the 
reputation 
community
1st decision
Pairs are randomly 
formed within the 
annonymous 
community
Subject i joins the annonymous 
community by not disclosing 
Period t + 1
Subject i
played under 
the reputation 
comminity
Subject i played 
under the 
annonymous 
comminity
Period tPeriod t - 1
1st decision
Each subject decides whether 
to disclose their last-period 
allocation amount to their 
matched partner.
2nd decision
Public goods
game with a 
partner
Period t + 1
Random 
matching 
moving to 
period t + 1
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Figure 2. Period-by-Period Average Contributions and the Percentage of the Subjects Who Joined the Reputation Community 
 
    
(I) C-Sorting and C-RM treatments  
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(II) F-Sorting and F-RM treatments  
Notes: The red dash line depicted in figure (b) shows the average of last-period contributions made by the disclosers’ matched partners to the joint accounts in the 
C-Sorting (F-Sorting) treatment in Panel I (Panel II). See Appendix Figure C.1 for period-by-period diagrams of subjects’ moving-in and moving-out of the 
reputation community in the C-Sorting and F-Sorting treatments, which shows that there are a stable number of events with moving-in and moving-out in every 
period in the two sorting treatments.  
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Table 2. The Impact of Information Disclosure or Sorting on Cooperation 
     
Independent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
     
C-RM dummy {= 1 for the C-RM 
treatment; 0, otherwise}(#1) 
1.99 
(1.39) 
1.91 
(1.20) 
1.99 
(1.39) 
1.91 
(1.20) 
C-Sorting dummy {= 1 for the C-Sorting 
treatment; 0, otherwise} (#2) 
5.19*** 
(1.38) 
5.57*** 
(1.52) 
--- --- 
C-Sorting reputation  
    community dummy (#2a) 
--- --- 
7.82*** 
(1.39) 
7.65*** 
(1.47) 
C-Sorting anonymous  
    community dummy (#2b) 
--- --- 
2.52* 
(1.30) 
3.96** 
(1.79) 
F-RM dummy {= 1 for the F-RM 
treatment; 0, otherwise} (#3) 
3.57** 
(1.52) 
3.74*** 
(1.24) 
3.57** 
(1.52) 
3.74*** 
(1.12) 
F-Sorting dummy {= 1 for the F-Sorting 
treatment; 0, otherwise} (#4) 
4.07*** 
(1.58) 
3.67*** 
(1.35) 
--- --- 
F-Sorting reputation  
    community dummy (#4a) 
--- --- 
5.27*** 
(1.72) 
5.43*** 
(1.56) 
F-Sorting anonymous  
    community dummy (#4b) 
--- --- 
.95 
(1.57) 
-.47 
(1.78) 
Period Number  
     {= 2, 3, …, 19, 20} 
--- -.16*** 
(.039) 
--- -.16*** 
(.039) 
     
Constant 3.91*** 5.70*** 3.91*** 5.70*** 
 (1.24) (1.06) (1.24) (1.06) 
     
# of Observations 380 380 529 529 
     
p-value (two-sided) for Wald tests to the following hypothesis:   
H0: (#1) = (#2) .0003*** .0028*** --- --- 
H0: (#1) = (#2a) --- --- .0000*** .0000*** 
H0: (#1) = (#2b) --- --- .4763 .1841 
H0: (#1) = (#3) .1459 .0060*** .1460 .0061*** 
H0: (#1) = (#4) .0735* .0767* --- --- 
H0: (#2) = (#3) .1274 .1139 --- --- 
H0: (#2) = (#4) .3284 .1659 --- --- 
H0: (#3) = (#4) .7001 .9357 --- --- 
H0: (#3) = (#4a) --- --- .2503 .1599 
H0: (#3) = (#4b) --- --- .0448** .0044*** 
H0: (#2a) = (#2b) --- --- .0000*** .0130** 
H0: (#4a) = (#4b) --- --- .0001*** .0000*** 
H0: (#2a) = (#4a) --- --- .0575* .1473 
     
Notes: Linear regressions. Standard errors, in parentheses, were clustered by session. Random effects were included 
to control for panel structure because treatment dummies are included as regressors. Dependent variable is session-
average contributions in period t. Observations in period 2 to 20 are used as data. The reference group is data from 
the BASELINE treatment.  In addition to the Period Number variable, the interaction term between each treatment 
dummy and the Period Number variable was added as control variables in columns (2) and (4); because all the 
interaction terms, except the interaction term between variable (#4b) and Period number (for which the coefficient 
estimate is .13 and significant at the 5% level), failed to obtain significant coefficients we did not include them in 
this table to conserve space.   
   *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively.  
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Figure 3. Average Contribution Amounts by Disclosure Decision in the C-RM and F-RM 
treatments 
 
(1) The C-RM treatment 
 
(2) The F-RM treatment 
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Notes: CC and FR refer to conditional cooperators and free riders, respectively. The ‘all subjects’ category includes 
also cooperation types other than conditional cooperators and free riders. 
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Table 3. Subjects’ Contributions, Beliefs, and Partners’ Last-Period Contribution Amounts 
(a) Relationship between the Subjects’ Contributions and Beliefs on their Partners’ Contribution 
Amounts 
Dependent variable: Subject i’s contribution amount to his or her joint account in period t, 
where t ∈ {2, 3, …, 19}. 
 
       
Data: The random-matching 
community 
The reputation 
community#2 
The anonymous 
community#3 
 
Independent Variable: 
(1)#1 
C-RM 
(2)#1 
F-RM 
(3) 
C-Sorting 
(4) 
F-Sorting 
(5) 
C-Sorting 
(6) 
F-Sorting 
       
       
(i) Subject i’s belief on 
his or her matched 
partner’s contribution 
amount in period t 
.58*** 
(.027) 
.49*** 
(.055) 
.45*** 
(.046) 
.55*** 
(.078) 
39*** 
(.045) 
.26 
(.18) 
Constant  
2.52*** 
(.16) 
4.22*** 
(.39) 
6.77*** 
(.56) 
4.03*** 
(.69) 
3.58*** 
(.32) 
4.36** 
(.84) 
       
# of Observations 864 792 423 559 369 233 
F 486.71 78.08 93.57 50.69 77.60 2.25 
Prob > F .0002 .0031 .0023 .0057 .0031 .2302 
       
 
Notes: Linear regressions. Standard errors in parenthesis were clustered by session. Individual fixed effects were 
included to control for panel structure. Observations in period 20 were not included because the usual end-game 
defection was observed (Andreoni, 1988). The results are similar even if observations in period 20 are included (the 
results are omitted in the table to conserve space). See Appendix Table C.5 for results when individual random-
effects ordered probit regressions with standard errors clustered by session were used to estimate the relationships. 
#1 
We also ran the same regressions while also having a dummy variable which equals 1 (0) if subject i’s period t 
partner did not disclose (disclosed) his or her period t – 1 contribution amount as an independent variable. The 
analysis shows that the dummy variable fails to obtain a significant coefficient while independent variable (i) 
obtains a significantly positive coefficient (the size of the coefficient estimates are almost similar to the ones in the 
above table). The results are omitted to conserve space. 
#2 
A small number of the disclosers were matched with non-disclosers as explained in the text. Results in columns 
(3) and (4) are similar even if we exclude the observations in which disclosers were matched with non-disclosers. 
The results are omitted to conserve space. 
#3 
A small number of the non-disclosers were matched with disclosers as explained in the text. Results in columns 
(5) and (6) are similar even if we exclude the observations in which non-disclosers were matched with disclosers. 
The results are omitted to conserve space.  
   *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
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(b) Relationship between the Subjects’ Belief Formation and Partners’ Last-period Contributions 
(b1) The C-RM and F-RM treatments 
Dependent variable: Subject i’s belief on his or her matched person j’s contribution amount in 
period t, where t ∈ {2, 3, …, 19}. 
 
   
 C-RM F-RM 
Independent Variable: (1) (2) 
   
   
(1 – the No Information dummy)  
j’s period t – 1 contribution amount  
.32*** 
(.016) 
.39*** 
(.075) 
Constant 
4.84*** 
(.055) 
4.44*** 
(.52) 
# of Observations 864 792 
F 388.97 26.45 
Prob > F .0003 .0142 
   
 
Notes: Linear regressions. Standard errors in parenthesis were clustered by session. Individual fixed effects were 
included. The reference group is those whose matched partners did not disclose their last-period contribution 
amounts. Observations in period 20 were not included because of the strong end-game defection observed in the 
experiment. However, results are similar even if observations in period 20 was included (the results are omitted to 
conserve space). The No Information dummy equals 1 if subject i’s period t matched person j did not disclose his or 
her last-period contribution amount in period t; and 0 otherwise. See Appendix Table C.5 for results when individual 
random-effects ordered probit regressions with standard errors clustered by session were used to estimate the 
relationships. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
 
(b2) The Reputation Community in the C-Sorting and F-Sorting treatments 
Dependent variable: Subject i’s belief on his or her matched discloser j’s contribution amount 
in period t, where t ∈ {2, 3, …, 19}, in the reputation community. 
 
   
 C-Sorting F-Sorting 
Independent Variable: (1) (2) 
   
   
Subject i’s period t matched discloser j’s 
period t – 1 contribution amount  
.48*** 
(.053) 
.42*** 
(.031) 
Constant 
6.03*** 
(.74) 
4.51*** 
(.33) 
# of Observations 384 520 
F 82.56 181.71 
Prob > F .0028 .0009 
   
 
Notes: Linear regression. Standard errors in parenthesis were clustered by session. Individual fixed effects were also 
included. Only observations in which discloser i was matched with another discloser j were used in the regression 
analyses. Observations in period 20 were not included because of the strong end-game defection observed in the 
experiment. However, results are similar even if observations in period 20 was included (the results are omitted to 
conserve space). See Appendix Table C.5 for results when individual random-effects ordered probit regressions with 
standard errors clustered by session were used to estimate the relationships. 
  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively.
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Figure 4. Period-by-Period Average Contributions and the Percentage of the Subjects Who Paid a Fee to Join the Paid 
Community in the C-Sorting-N treatment 
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Figure 5. The Trends of Average Contribution in the Info treatment 
 
 
                          (a) Average contributions                                                      (b) Average beliefs 
 
Notes: 1. The average payoffs in the C-Sorting anonymous community and the Info treatment are monotonic 
transformation of average contributions, based on Eq. (1). The average payoffs in the C-Sorting reputation 
community are monotonic transformation of average contributions, based on Eq. (1), minus 1 (sorting cost). 
Thus, the average payoffs are lower in the C-Sorting reputation community than in the Info treatment by around 
1 ECU. 
2. As in other treatments, the average beliefs in the Info treatment transited similar to the average contributions. 
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